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I. INTRODUCTION
A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
O N SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 and the ensuing weeks and
months ahead, newspaper headlines conveyed the story:
"In the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, hijackers flew two
airliners into the World Trade Center today, collapsing both
towers into flaming rubble, and crashed another aircraft at the
Pentagon, shutting down the government and financial markets
* J.D., 2003, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.,
2000, The University of Texas at San Antonio. The author wishes to thank his
mother, Myrta and his father, Erwin, for all their love and support.
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and spreading fear throughout America."1  "Hours later, a
fourth airliner. . .went down in western Pennsylvania. ' 2 "The
toll of dead or injured was expected to climb into the
thousands."3 "In a matter of just a few minutes, the nation's
largest city and the nation's capital had been plunged into an
unimaginable disaster."4
"Hijackers rammed jetliners into each of New York's World
Trade Center towers yesterday, toppling both in a hellish storm
of ash, glass, smoke and leaping victims, while a third jediner
crashed into the Pentagon in Virginia."' 5 "There was no official
count, but President Bush said thousands had perished, and in
the immediate aftermath the calamity was already being ranked
the worst and most audacious terror attack in American
history."6
"A stunning multipronged terrorist attack struck the United
States today as hijacked airplanes plowed into both giant towers
of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington."7 "The clearly coordinated attacks appeared to be
the most broad-scale act of violence on the nation since the Jap-
anese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
'8
"Responding to what one U.S. senator termed a 'second Pearl
Harbor,' U.S. officials grappled with how to respond to an en-
emy who was not immediately identified, although speculation
was rampant. As smoke from the attacks hung over New York
City and Washington, the realization set in that the country may
be in the extraordinary position of being at war - yet without a
clear target for counter-attack."9
"Adding to the industry's global woes, a brief communique
from the Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters Association of London
yesterday has plunged the world's airlines into a new crisis.
Geraldine Baum & Maggie Farley, Terrorism Hits the U.S.: Terror Attack, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at S1.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Geraldine Baum & Matea Gold, Terrorism Hits the US.: A Day of Carnage and
Chaos, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at S1.
5 Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked: President Vows to Exact Punishment for "Evil",
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
6 Id.
7 Cragg Hines, Assault on America: Terrorists Strike from Air, HOUSTON CHRONI-
CLE, Sept. 11, 2001, at El.
8 Id.
9 Michael Kranish, Bush: US. to Hunt Down the Attackers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
11, 2001, at A6.
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From October 1, any aircraft of more than 19 seats in any part of
the world could be grounded unless the issue of drastically re-
duced cover for third-party war and terrorism damage is
resolved."10
"Lawmakers worldwide late last week were scrambling to pass
emergency legislation to prevent all air travel from abruptly halt-
ing this week due to sweeping liability insurance problems that
air carriers face following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the
United States."1'
"The terrorism fallout has left airlines worldwide grappling
with massive insurance increases. Without adequate insurance
no airline can fly."' 12 "Insurance underwriters around the globe
told airlines that war risk policies could be canceled as early as
today [September 24, 2001]."3
"As of midnight Monday [September 24, 2001] in London,
airline insurers in various countries canceled their existing war-
risk policies and effectively switched carriers over to contracts
that offer reduced coverage at a higher cost. ' 14 "Facing poten-
tial restrictions on what planes they could operate and which
airports they could use because of the reduced coverage airlines
over the weekend turned to their home governments for
help. 15
"Airports across the country are struggling to protect them-
selves financially after having their insurance coverage for war
and acts of terrorism canceled in the wake of the Sept. 11 at-
tacks. ' 16 "Facing massive losses ... insurance companies quickly
stopped such disaster coverage for airlines, airports, and avia-
tion service companies."'" "Six days after the attacks, Los Ange-
les International Airport was notified that its coverage was being
10 Ben Sandilands, Two U.S. Airlines Fear Collapse, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 21,
2001, at 29.
11 Dave Lenckus & Carolyn Aldred, Policy Cancellations May Ground Aircraft, 35:
39 Bus. INS., Sept. 24, 2001, at 1.
12 Bruce Horovitz, Airlines Get Help With High Insurance Costs For Now, USA To-
DAY, Sept. 24, 2001, at B5.
13 Id.
14 Zach Coleman, The Aftermath of Terror: Asian Airlines to Keep Normal Schedules,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2001, at 11.
15 Id.
16 Jeffrey L. Rabin, Airports "Fly Blind" With No Insurance Liability: LAX and Other
Facilities Struggle to Find New Coverage For War and Acts Of Terrorism to Replace Policies
Canceled After Attacks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at A5.
17 Id.
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discontinued in one week."' 8 The world's third busiest airport
went without the coverage it previously had for up to $750 mil-
lion in damage from acts of war or terrorism. 9
B. THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11: WHERE Do WE STAND?
Obviously, the most damage to privately insured property
took place in New York City. As to the damage, any disputes
regarding policy coverage would most likely be decided under
New York law. 'Insurance commentators generally recognize
that most terrorist attacks are covered under property and casu-
alty insurance policies. 2' Generally, commercial property policy
forms provided by the Insurance Services Office and used by
most insurers do not carry terrorist exclusions, although they do
provide exclusions for declared, undeclared, or civil war and for
warlike actions by military forces.2 1 New York law is construed
by two seminal war-risk cases, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.2 2 and Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insur-
ance Co. 23 These cases, and other relevant authority, make it
clear that the war-risk exclusions found in most all-risk policies
will not exclude the events of September 11, 2001, in the ab-
sence of proof that those who destroyed the towers did so in an
attempt to overthrow the U.S. government or were agents for a
sovereign, foreign power.
Islamic militant Osama Bin Laden was not at the time the
head of a governmental organization but rather seemed to be
the leader of a terrorist group divided into a worldwide scatter-
ing of cells. Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization have
been recognized by most countries as the perpetrators of the
September 11 atrocities and remain the focus of a worldwide
hunt. In 1996, Bin Laden sought refuge in Afghanistan. Cur-
rently, there is no evidence that Osama Bin Laden ever con-
trolled the Taliban government or any other sovereign
government at the time before, during or after the September
11 attacks. The Taliban denied any direct involvement in the
September 11 attacks and even insisted that Bin Laden was not
involved. That claim is yet to be proved or disproved. The ter-
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 8 Auto Insurance Report, Fallout From NY and DC Attacks Reverberates Far, Wide
and Long 1 (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.riskinformation.com.
21 Id.
22 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (1974).
23 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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rorist activities of Bin Laden's organization had been aimed at
punishing America for its support of Israel and moderate Arab
states. At present, the proof necessary to sustain a denial of
these claims under most war-risk exclusions does not appear to
be present. Certainly all the evidence is not yet in. Any carrier
denying coverage pursuant to the war-risk exclusions discussed
below would bear the burden of proving the attacks were de-
signed to overthrow the U.S. government or were committed by
agents of a sovereign, foreign power. The precise wording of
each policy is, therefore, critical to any determination of cover-
age. Many aviation hull policies in particular contain terrorism
exclusions that, based on current reports, would appear to ex-
clude coverage for these losses.
C. THE FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON AIRLINES
United Airlines had $1.5 billion of liability insurance per air-
craft per occurrence, and American Airlines had at least $1.5
billion of liability insurance. The insurers that participated in
the 2000 aviation underwriting pool for U.S. Aircraft Insurance
Group led United's liability and hull coverage. London-based
Global Aerospace Underwriting Managers Ltd. was American
Airlines' lead insurer. If insurers were to treat each hijacking as
a separate occurrence, the commercial aviation insurance mar-
ket would have faced up to $6 billion in losses, which exceeded
the market's premium volume from commercial airlines for the
previous four calendar years combined. Liability losses stem-
ming from the crashes at the Pentagon and in the Pennsylvania
countryside, though, would likely be far less than the airlines'
liability limits. The insured value of the hijacked planes totaled
$128.8 million, ranging from $21 million to $45 million each.
The hull war risk market paid those losses just days after the
terrorist attacks.
In mid-September, six days after the attack, insurers began
giving notice to airlines that their war and allied perils buyback
coverage would be cancelled within a week.24 Insurers, though,
would allow airlines to purchase $50 million of the coverage for
$1.25 per passenger per enplanement (each time a passenger
was ticketed) .25 Fifty million dollars of coverage was only a sub-
limit of a typical commercial airlines' liability coverage6.2 Based
24 See Global Letter, supra text accompanying note 21.
25 Lenckus & Aldred, supra note 11.
26 See id.
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on a 20% reduction of 2000 enplanement figures, the buyback
charge would then cost United Airlines more than $83.8 million
annually, American Airlines more than $86.2 million annually,
and Delta Air Lines Inc. nearly $105.6 million annually.27 De-
spite the airline industry's financial nightmares, they still found
themselves obligated to purchase war and allied perils coverage
to comply with the terms of their airplane leasing agreements,
bond issues and unsecured loans from financial institutions.
28
Without the coverage, airlines would have to ground their
planes. But before the September 11 attacks, airlines had their
full liability policy limits to cover third-party losses on the
ground resulting from hijackings or other terrorist acts involv-
ing airlines. 29 Those limits more than satisfied the $500 million
hijacking and terrorist coverage requirements that leasing com-
panies and banks imposed on airlines." As a result of the new
$50 million sublimit that insurers imposed, the already cash-
strapped airlines found themselves $450 million short of meet-
ing their leaseholder, bond and bank requirements." Under
Congressional legislation, the United States federal government
agreed to cover terrorist-related liabilities exceeding $100 mil-
lion that any air carrier incurrred within 180 days of enactment
of the bill.3 2 Coupled with the $50 million of war and allied
perils coverage available from aviation insurers, the legislation
seemed to leave each airline on the hook for $50 million of ter-
rorist-related liabilities."
In the United Kingdom, the government covered the war and
allied perils risks excess of $50 million 4 for airlines, airports,
and security firms. The government planned to charge for the
coverage but would waive the charge for the first 30 days "in
recognition of the particular circumstances which the airlines
face at present. '35 Similar discussions began taking place world-







32 See infra Part 1V.C.




This Comment looks at the potential application of "war ex-
clusions" and the significance of terms such as "war," "hi-
jacking," "terrorist," "insurrection," and "civil war." The
interpretation of these terms may cause insurers and reinsurers
all over the world to re-evaluate their war exclusions. This Com-
ment examines the effect of the September 11, 2001 incidents
on aviation insurance for air carriers and aviation insurance
providers.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION INSURANCE
Aviation insurance surfaced a little over ninety years ago when
Lloyd's of London developed the first policy in 1911.36 The pol-
icy covered only legal liability.37 Aviation insurance did not truly
develop in the United States until 1919 when Travelers Insur-
ance Company announced a comprehensive insurance program
for air risks.38
Several factors contributed to the stability of commercial avia-
tion and the establishment of the United States aviation insur-
ance market: first, the Air Mail Act of 1925 allowed private
carriers to transport mail;" second, the Air Commerce Act of
1926 called for safety rules and regulations and the licensing of
pilots;4 ° and finally, Charles Lindbergh's historic transatlantic
flight stimulated a massive build up of the aviation industry and
furthered an interest in aviation insurance.41
Consequently, competition led to the creation of groups fo-
cused on serving aviation insurance's needs.42 Fire insurance
companies and casualty insurance companies pooled themselves
to spread aviation risks.43 There were three early groups be-
tween 1927 and 1929: the United States Aircraft Insurance
Group (USAIG) managed by the United States Aviation Under-
writers, Inc. (USAU), the Associated Aviation Underwriters
(AAU), and the Aero Insurance Underwriters (AIU).44 The
36 ALEXANDER T. WELLS & BRUCE D. CHADBOURNE, INTRODUCTION TO AVIATION
INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 4 (1992).
37 Id.
38 Id.





44 Id. at 6-7.
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group approach is still the preferred method of operation in the
United States.45
A period of growth and confusion developed during the years
immediately following World War II, and industry overexpan-
sion led to the failure of the AIU in 1947. Around this time
independent underwriters decided to begin providing direct avi-
ation insurance. In 1946 the Insurance Company of North
America (INA) started a program to serve owners of private
planes, aircraft dealers, corporate operators and fixed-base
operators.4 6
The 1960s were a period of booming growth in all segments
of the aviation industry.47 This growth led to significant expan-
sion and competition in the insurance and reinsurance mar-
kets.4 8 Although this period of profitability persisted through
the 1970s, the 1980s brought an abrupt halt.49 The 1980s were a
period of intense media focus on general aviation accidents, ac-
companied by an increasingly litigious society.50 The years since
have been a period of fluctuation affected by safety records, cur-
rency fluctuations and the expansion of foreign insurance
underwriters.51
III. THE AVIATION INSURANCE POLICY
Modern aviation insurance is generally classified as hull insur-
ance or liability insurance. 52 Aviation insurance policies gener-
ally cover the following: (1) aviation hull insurance, (2) aviation
liability insurance, (3) airport owners and operator insurance,
and (4) aviation manufacturers' insurance.53 Although separate
policies may be issued, the most common aviation policies com-
bine both hull and third-party liability coverage.54
The basic content and structure of the typical aviation insur-
ance policy includes: (1) insuring agreements; (2) definitions;
(3) exclusions; (4) conditions; and (5) declarations.55 Specific
45 Id. at 8.
46 Id. at 10.
47 See id. at 12-15.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 17.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 2 BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE § 19.04 [1] (Matthew
Bender ed., 2001) [hereinafter BUSINESS INSURANCE].
53 See id. § 19.03 [1].
54 Id. § 19.04 [1].
5 Id. § 19.03 [1].
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provisions will be included for the particular risks being in-
sured. 56 The "insuring agreements section describes the risk be-
ing undertaken for each type of risk covered, identifies the
insured, and establishes the insurer's duty to defend or indem-
nify the insured. '57 The definitions section will define terms ap-
pearing in the policy.58 The exclusions section limits coverage
under the policy for loss caused by certain events. 59 The in-
surer's duty to defend or indemnify may be suspended for any
loss resulting from these excluded events. 60 Insurers have the
burden of proof when relying solely on exclusions.61 If the ex-
clusion is unclear or ambiguous it will be construed strictly
against the insurer.62 Some major aircraft hull coverage exclu-
sions include wear and tear, tires, embezzlement, war confisca-
tion, and depreciation or loss of use.63 The conditions section
relates to the required duties of parties in case of a loss, accident
or claim. 64 A condition is usually a condition precedent to the
liability of the insurer. 15 An insurer can reject a policy if the
insured (1) fails to meet the terms of a condition precedent and
(2) the insured failed to prove the use of reasonable care and
diligence in attempting to comply.66 The declarations section
provides identifying information, summarizes relevant facts, re-
views the scope of the coverage and recites the limits of
liability.67
Aircraft hull represents actual physical damage to the aircraft
itself.68 Aircraft hull insurance protects aircraft owners, opera-
tors, and other parties with a direct financial interest (such as
lienholders) from replacement costs, repairs, accidental loss of,
or damage to the aircraft.69 Hull insurance can be written ei-
ther as an "all-risk" policy or as a "named perils" policy. 70 A
56 Id.
57 Id. § 19.03 [2].
58 Id. § 19.03 [3].




63 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 104-05.
64 BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [5].
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. § 19.04 [6].
68 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 102.
69 ROD D. MARGO, AVIATION INSURANCE 145 (1989); BUSINESS INSURANCE
§ 19.04 [2].
70 BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [2].
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named perils policy will list and define covered perils such as:
fire, lightning, hail, smoke, vandalism, snow, or ice. 71 An all-risk
policy will cover all perils unless they are otherwise excluded.7 2
All-risk policies provide broader coverage, and although they
cost more, are much more common.7 3 A critical difference be-
tween the policies is the insurer's burden of proof in denying
coverage.74 In an all-risk policy the insurer must show that cov-
erage does not apply to a specific loss; therefore, it is more diffi-
cult for an insurer to deny coverage.75 Under a named perils
policy, an insurer only has to show that a specific peril listed
within the policy caused a loss. 76 By writing exclusions into the
all-risk policy, the insured party is automatically indemnified for
losses without having to be involved in a battle between the all-
risk policy and the war risk policy. 77 If an insured party has both
an all-risk policy and a war risk policy, the all risk insurer has the
burden of showing the loss is excluded from coverage before
the insured can claim coverage for the loss from the war risk
78carrier.
All-risk insurance comprises three general categories: (1) "all-
risk-ground and flight," (2) "all-risk-not in motion," and (3)
"all-risk-not in flight. ' 79 All-risk-ground and flight provides
the broadest coverage by extending protection to aircrafts while
they are on the ground or in the air when loss occurs.80 All-
risk-not in motion provides coverage for physical loss or dam-
age to an aircraft while it is on the ground and not moving
under its own power or momentum.81 All-risk-not in flight
covers the aircraft while it is stationary or while taxiing. 2
71 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 222.
72 Id.
73 Id.; BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [2] [a].
74 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 222.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Rod D. Margo, Aspects of Insurance in Aviation Finance, 62 J. AIR L. & CONI.
423, 447-48 (1996) [hereinafter Aviation Finance].
78 Id.
79 BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [2] [a].
80 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 102.
81 Id.
82 Id. See generally Compass Ins. Co. v. Vanguard Ins. Co., 649 F.2d 331, 333
(5th Cir. 1981) (defining "in flight" as "the period from the time the aircraft
moves forward in taking off. . . for air transit, while in the air, and until the
aircraft completes its landing and landing run after contact with the land or
water"; defining "taxiing" as the period when an aircraft is in motion, but not in
flight).
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Aviation liability insurance or "third-party" insurance is issued
primarily for the benefit of passengers and individuals or prop-
erty on the ground.8 3 It "provides the policyholder with protec-
tion against third party claims involving bodily injury or
property damage because of ownership, maintenance, or use of
aircraft." 4 A typical aviation liability policy will cover: (1) bodily
injury, excluding passenger liability; (2) passenger liability; (3)
property damage liability; and (4) medical payments.85
Airport owners and operators policies cover injury or damage
to third parties occurring on airport property or due to airport
operations.86 Coverage includes: (1) airport premises-opera-
tions; (2) hangar keepers' liability; and (3) product liability.
87
IV. WAR, HIJACKING AND TERRORISM INSURANCE
A. EMERGENCE OF WAR RISK INSURANCE
The United States and London insurance markets suffered
heavy losses during the Spanish Civil War.88 As a result, in 1936-
37 the insurance industry entered into the "War and Civil War
Risks Agreement."8 9 In the United States the agreement gener-
ally meant, "exclusive of the United States and Canada, no un-
derwriter will insure against damages due to war, including civil
war."9 In London, the insurance market (including Lloyd's)
excluded coverage for "war on land risks" except for on landed
cargo.91 Presently, United States aviation all-risk insurers still ex-
clude loss from "war and civil risks" by prescribing to the Com-
mon North American Airline War Exclusion Clause (CWEC).O2
83 BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [3] [a].
84 WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 108.
85 BUSINESS INSURANCE § 19.04 [3] [a].
86 Id. § 19.04 [4] [a].
87 Id.
88 Kathleen E. Shannon, Rulings on War-Risk Exclusion: A Major Concern of Insur-
ers, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1984, at A1;Jennifer Thompson & Simon Sloane, War and
Terrorism-Exclusions, Extensions and Issues of Aggregation in the Non-Marine Markets,
Holman Fenwick & Willan, at http://www.hfw.com/13/new/fnewl3b.html (last
visited July 1, 2003).
89 Id.
90 Shannon, supra note 88, at Al.
91 Thompson & Sloane, supra note 88.
92 The CWEC excludes any losses arising from:
(a) War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war
be declared or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution or insurrection,
military or usurped power or confiscation and/or nationalization
or requisition or destruction by any government or public or local
authority or by any independent unit or individual engaged in ac-
20031
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The War, Hijacking and Other Perils Exclusion Clause (AVN
48B) used by the London market is different in that it does not
attempt to exclude hijackings by persons not aboard the air-
craft.13 The London market introduced this clause after the
1968 Israeli raid on Beirut airport and it is now found in every
aviation hull and liability policy.94 Both AVN 48B and the
CWEC are found in policies issued in the United States.95 Some
tivities in furtherance of a program of irregular warfare. Any or all
of the above applying howsoever and wheresoever ocurring. (b)
Any hostile detonation of any weapon of war employing atomic or
nuclear fission and/or fusion or other like reaction or radioactive
force or matter. (c) Other than excluded in paragraph (a) herein-
above, any unlawful seizure, diversion or exercise of control of the
aircraft, or attempt thereat, by force or threat thereof or by any
other form of intimidation, by any person or persons whether on
board aircraft or otherwise. (d) Other than as excluded in para-
graph (a) hereinabove, strikes, lockouts, disturbances, riots, civil
commotion. (e) Other than as excluded in paragraph (a) herein-
above, vandalism, sabotage, malicious act or other act intended to
cause loss or damage.
MARGO, supra note 69, at 253-54 & n.239.
93 It states:
This Policy does not cover claims caused by (a) War, invasion, acts
of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not),
civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, martial law, military or
usurped power or attempts at usurpation of power. (b) Any hostile
detonation of any weapon of war employing atomic or nuclear fis-
sion and/or fusion or other like reaction or radioactive force or
matter. (c) Strikes, riots, civil commotions or labour disturbances.
(d) Any act of one or more persons, whether or not agents of a
sovereign Power, for political or terrorist purposes and whether the
loss or damage resulting therefrom is accidental or intentional. (e)
Any malicious act or act of sabotage. (f) Confiscation, nationalisa-
tion seizure, restraint, detention, appropriation, requisition for title
or use by or under the order of any Government (whether civil
military or de factor) or public or local authority. (g) Hijacking or
any unlawful seizure or wrongful exercise of control of the Aircraft
or crew in flight (including any attempt at such seizure or control)
made by any person or persons on board the Aircraft acting with-
out the consent of the Insured. Furthermore this Policy does not
cover claims arising whilst the Aircraft is outside control of the In-
sured by reason of any of the above perils. The Aircraft shall be
deemed to have been restored to the control of the Insured on the
safe return of aircraft to the Insured at an airfield not excluded by
the geographical limits of this Policy, and entirely suitable for the
operation of the Aircraft (such safe return shall require that the
Aircraft be parked with engines shut down and under no duress).
MARGO, supra note 69, app. at 417.
94 Id. at 223.
,15 Aviation Finance, supra note 77, at 445-46.
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of the risks excluded in both the CWEC and AVN 48B clauses
can be "written back" into hull or liability all-risks policies.96
These risks available for "write back" are available at an extra
premium and are specified in Extended Coverage Endorse-
ments.97 Risks that can be written back into aircraft hull policies
include strikes, riots, civil commotions, acts of sabotage, and hi-
jacking.98 Liability all-risk policies allow for all risks to be written
back except for the hostile explosion of a nuclear weapon.99 In
the case of aircraft hull policies, some might desire full coverage
for war risks or other risks not included in the Extended Cover-
age Endorsements. It is then necessary to purchase an aviation
war and civil risks policy. United States insurers do not provide
full war risk insurance; therefore, such coverage must be pur-
chased from the London specialist war insurance market and
not from the aviation market.'00
B. WAR RISK EXCLUSIONS AND THE COURTS
While President Bush condemned the atrocities as "acts of
war," insurers must go further in analyzing the coverage af-
forded by their policies. Such analysis must recognize funda-
mental principles for the construction of all-risk policies of
property insurance. All-risk policies do not cover all losses. How-
ever, once the insured demonstrates the existence of the policy
and fortuitous physical damage to covered property, the burden
falls on the insurer to prove that the physical damage resulted
from one or more of the excluded causes of loss. Prior cases
interpreting similar war-risk exclusions illustrate the point.
One dictionary defines "war" as: "Hostile conflict by means of
armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or
sometimes between parties within the same nation or state." '
Case law precedent does not support the application of the
"war" exclusion to the terrorist acts of September 11. United
States courts have consistently followed British courts, generally
96 Id. at 446.
97 Id.
98 Id.; see also MARCO, supra note 69, app. at 419 (showing Form AVN 51-
Extended Coverage Endorsement (Aircraft Hulls)).
99 Aviation Finance, supra note 77, at 446-47; see also MARGO, supra note 69, app.
at 419 (showing Form AVN 52C-Extended Coverage Endorsement (Aircraft
Liabilities)).
100 E.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989,
994; MARGO, supra note 69, app. at 225.
101 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1576 (7th ed. 1999).
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allowing a war exclusion clause to apply only when damage is
caused by the genuine warlike acts of sovereign governments en-
gaged in hostile activities.
The courts will apply fundamental principles for the construc-
tion of all-risk policies when analyzing claims by an insured that
a policy with a war exclusion clause covers a loss. 10 2 Exclusions
will be narrowly construed so as to maximize coverage.1"3 The
insurer has the burden of proving application of the exclu-
sion.1 4 Similarly, the insured must prove that that the loss is
within the terms of the policy. 10 5 Generally, the loss will be cov-
ered by the policy, and the insurer will have to prove that the
loss is negated by the war exclusion. 10 6 Contrarily, when a war
risk policy is involved, the policy will be broadly construed to
"achieve coverage," therefore the insured will have to prove that
the policy covers the loss."0 7
The leading case on war risk exclusions and aviation hull in-
surance is Pan American World Airways, Incorporated v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Company, 08 where terrorists hijacked and later
destroyed a Pan Am airplane and the airline claimed the lost
property was covered under its insurance. In Pan American, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that where members of a
Palestinian terrorist group from Jordan hijacked an aircraft over
London and destroyed the aircraft on the ground while in
Egypt, the ensuing loss of the aircraft was not due to war within
the meaning of the term as used in the exclusionary clauses of
the all risk policies covering the aircraft. 0 9 Two members of the
PFLP forced the Brussels-New York flight (Pan Am 83) to divert
to Beirut, where it refueled and the hijackers brought aboard a
demolitions expert and explosives. I'0 The hijackers, members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) flew
the Boeing 747 to Cairo."' After evacuating the passengers and
crew, the plane was destroyed. 1 2 Two hours before the hi-
jacking of Pan Am 83, PFLP members hijacked two other trans-






108 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
109 Id. at 1022.




2003] AVIATION INSURANCE 435
Atlantic flights, TWA 741 out of Frankfurt and Swissair 100 out
of Zurich.113 A simultaneous attempt to hijack El Al Flight 219
was foiled in the air by airline security personnel. 14 Three days
later the PFLP hijacked a BOAC VC-10 and added it to the col-
lection. All the planes were taken to Dawson's Field in Jordan
where they were blown up.115 In Pan American, the main ques-
tion on appeal was whether the loss of the aircraft would be
borne by the three all-risk carriers or the war-risk carriers." 6
Pan American Airlines had three types of insurance providing
coverage: (1) all-risk insurance, (2) private sector war risk insur-
ance, and (3) a war risk insurance policy provided by the United
States Secretary of Transportation. 1 7 Because United States in-
surers do not provide private war risk insurance, Pan American
purchased a policy from the London market and then turned to
the United States government for coverage above the London
limit.11 8 The all-risk insurance was provided by the only three
underwriters in the world who wrote aviation hull insurance for
United States air carriers: the United States Aviation Insurance
Group (USAIG), members of the Lloyd's underwriting syndicate
(Lloyd's) and the Associated Aviation Underwriters (AAU)." 9
The three all-risk carriers asserted a war risk exclusion.1 2 0
113 Id. at 999.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 993.
117 See id. at 994-96.
118 Id. at 995.
119 Id. at 993-94.
120 The exclusions in the all-risk policies read:
C. This policy does not cover anything herein to the contrary not-
withstanding loss or damage due to or resulting from: 1. capture,
seizure, arrest, restraint or detention or the consequences thereof
or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of the property insured or
damage to or destruction thereof by any Government or govern-
mental authority or agent (whether secret or otherwise) or by any
military, naval or usurped power, whether any of the foregoing be
done by way of requisition or otherwise and whether in time of
peace or war and whether lawful or unlawful (this subdivision 1
shall not apply, however, to any such action by a foreign govern-
mental authority following the forceful diversion to a foreign coun-
try by any person not in lawful possession or custody of such
insured aircraft and who is no an agent or representative, secret or
otherwise, of any foreign government or governmental authority);
2. war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or war-
like operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not; 3.
strikes, riots, civil commotion.
Id. at 994.
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The twenty-four day trial involved forty-one witnesses and over
four hundred exhibits.1 2' The all- risk carriers introduced evi-
dence of the history of war and political tension in the Middle
East and Jordan. 122 They attempted to show that the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), PFLP and other Palestinian or-
ganizations were "operated as paramilitary quasi-governments"
in order to prove that the actions of the PFLP in comman-
deering and destroying the Pan Am jet fell within the exclusions
quoted above.1 23 The PFLP was described as an extreme mili-
tant offshoot of the PLO with about 600 to 1,200 total members
and a committed core of 150 receiving funding and weapons
from China and North Korea. 124 Although the destruction of
Israel was its primary goal, the PFLP also condemned "reaction-
ary" Arab regimes, capitalism, and the United States.1 25 The hi-
jackers explained in their own words that they hijacked the
plane because of America's support of Israel. 126
The court agreed the loss would be covered if Pan American
or the war risk insurers could reasonably interpret the terms of
exclusion to allow coverage.1 27 The all-risk insurers had the bur-
den of showing more than just a reasonable interpretation
under which the loss would be excluded; they had to show that
an interpretation favoring them was the only reasonable reading
of at least one of the terms of exclusion.12 The court then in-
voked the rule of contra preferentum as the rule of construction
"when an insurer fails to use apt words to exclude a known
risk,"129 therefore "if the insurer desires to have more remote
causes determine the scope of exclusion, he may draft language
to effectuate that desire. ' 130 The circuit court was influenced by
the all-risk insurers' knowledge that the exclusions were ambigu-
ous as to the context of a political hijacking. Furthermore, the
all-risk insurers were aware of, and failed to use, more specific
121 Id. at 996.





127 Id. at 999-1000.
128 Id. at 1000 (citing Sincoffv. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 183 N.E.2d 899, 901
(N.Y. 1962)).
126 Id. (citing Nat'i Screen Serv. Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 364
F.2d 275, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1966)).
150 Id. at 1007.
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exclusionary terms, which other insurers use. 3 ' The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the use of one of those
clauses would have prevented the ensuing loss.13 2
The court followed a narrow construction of the policy in its
causation analysis.133 It adopted a mechanical test of proximate
causation for dealing with insurance cases. This test would look
only at the "causes nearest to the loss" and, in keeping with the
doctrine of contra proferentem, specific language must be
drafted if the insurance carrier wanted more remote causes to
affect the scope of exclusion. 134
The court found that the term "war" generally applied to the
"employment of force between governments or entities essen-
tially like governments, at least de facto.' 35 The court, citing
American and British caselaw and commentators stated, cases
have "established that war is a course of hostility engaged in by
entities that have at least significant attributes of sovereignty....
War is 'that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by
force."' 136 The court agreed that insurance caselaw defined war
as "hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments
at least de facto in character.' 1 37 The PFLP never claimed to be
a state and it could not act on behalf of any of the states in
which it existed when it hijacked the airplane, particularly since
those states consistently opposed hijacking.138 The hijackers
were "agents of a radical political group, rather than a sovereign
government. ' 139 The court concluded that, even if the PFLP was
131 Compare supra text accompanying note 104, with Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 1001
(quoting the exclusion clause available in the London market under Form AV-
48A: "This Policy does not cover claims directly or indirectly occasioned by, hap-
pening through or in consequences of: (d) Any act of one or more persons,
whether not agents of a sovereign Power, for political or terrorist purposes and
whether the loss or damage resulting therefrom is accidental or intentional. (e)
Any malicious act or act of sabotage. (g) Hi-jacking or any ulawful seizure or
wrongful exercise of control of the Aircraft or crew in flight .....
132 Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 1001.
133 The court explained that: "Remote causes of causes are not relevant to the
characterization of an insurance loss. In the context of this commercial litigation,
the causation inquiry stops at the efficient physical cause of the loss; it does not
trace events back to their metaphysical beginnings. The words 'due to or result-
ing from' limit the inquiry to the facts immediately surrounding the loss." Id. at
1006 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 58 (1950)).
134 Id. at 1007.
135 Id. at 1012.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1013.
139 Id. at 1015.
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waging a "guerilla war," a guerrilla group must have at least
some incidence of sovereignty before its activities can properly
be defined as war.'40 The act of the terrorists in hijacking the
airplane was, therefore, not an act of "war" or "warlike policies"
for purposes of the insurance exclusions. The court also re-
jected the insurers' claim of exclusion under the much broader
term of "warlike operations."
1 41
The circuit court then rejected the insurers' argument that
the hijacking was an act of "insurrection" within the meaning of
the policy terms. 142 It defined "insurrection" as "(1) a violent
uprising by a group or movement (2) acting for the specific pur-
pose of overthrowing the constituted government and seizing its
powers."143 The court held there was no causal element of in-
tent between the terrorist hijacking and an attempt at over-
throwing the Jordanian government.144 The act was intended as
a "symbolic blow" in the political group's battle against the
United States. 145 Furthermore, even if there had been an insur-
rection in Jordan, the hijacking resulted over a "domestically sta-
ble area" that at the moment was not engaged in war with
Jordan.'46 The court finally held that the loss from the terrorist
hijacking did not fall within any of the exclusions and was there-
fore covered under the all-risk policies. 147 Under the Pan Ameri-
can analysis, any insurance carriers bold enough to file a
September l1th war exclusion claim will find it very difficult to
prevail. First, the insurer will have to contend with the narrow
mechanical test of causation. The courts will look at the specific
acts of crashing airplanes into buildings without giving credit to
any outside motivations and will then inquire if such an act is an
act of war. Furthermore, a sovereign or quasi-sovereign power
140 Id. at 1013.
141 "There is no warrant in the general understanding of English, in history, or
in precedent for reading the phrase 'warlike operations' to encompass (1) the
infliction of intentional violence by political groups (neither employed by nor
representing governments) (2) upon civilian citizens of non-belligerent powers
and their property (3) at places far removed from the locale or the subject of any
warfare. (4) This conclusion is merely reinforced when the evident and avowed
purpose of the destructive action is not coercion or conquest in any sense, but
the striking of spectacular blows for propaganda effects." Id. at 1015-16.
142 Id. at 1019.
143 Id. at 1017.
144 Id. at 1019.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 1021.
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and not just a terrorist organization represented by scattered
cells must have committed such an act.
Another case that can provide significant guidance is Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 4" in which the U.S. District
Court in New York interpreted the broad exclusionary language
prefacing the war risk exclusion. The court quoted Pan Ameri-
can extensively and approvingly, declining to apply the war risks
exclusion to a claim for damages to the Beirut Holiday Inn in
Lebanon. 49 The Holiday Inn, Beirut (a city once viewed as the
"Paris of the Middle East") opened for business in 1974 in one
of the city's more expensive commercial districts. 50 What en-
sued is every tourist's worst nightmare. In 1975 the hotel be-
came the center of a fierce battle between factional groups
fighting for possession and control of the district.15 1 Between
October 1975 and April 1976 the hotel sustained continuous
damage from shelling and rockets. 152 The insurer, Aetna,
claimed the conflict in Lebanon fell under three excluded per-
ils: war, civil war, and insurrection.5 3
In examining the claim of "insurrection," the court adopted
the definition provided by Pan American.154 The court looked
for evidence of any damage caused to the hotel by an identifi-
able group or movement intent on overthrowing the existing
government and assuming power for itself.155 Although there
was continuous strife amongst the different factions in Lebanon,
none of them could be regarded as having the "maximum objec-
148 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (pro-
viding an excellent historical, social, and political background to the tragic vio-
lence in Lebanon).
149 See id. at 1461.
150 Id. at 1467-68.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 1467-72.
153 The exclusion provided:
2. This insurance does not cover: a) Loss or damage caused by any
of the perils hereby insured against, if such loss or damage either in
origin or extent is directly or indirectly, proximately or remotely,
occasioned by or contributed to by any of the following occur-
rences, or either in origin or extent, directly or indirectly, proxi-
mately or remotely, arises out of or in Connection with any such
occurrences, namely: "War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostili-
ties or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not) civil
war, mutiny, insurrection, revolution, conspiracy, military or
usurped power."
Id. at 1463.
154 Id. at 1487 (citing Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 1017).
155 Id. at 1487-88.
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tive" of overthrowing the Lebanese government. 5 6 Rather, the
various groups were striving to maintain a status quo that better
preserved their interests. 157 Aetna was unable to sustain its bur-
den of proving the "crucial element of intent to overthrow and
replace the government of Lebanon," and the court, therefore,
refused to uphold the insurrection exclusion. 158 The court then
disposed of the "civil war" claim by once again turning to Pan
American.'59 Aetna's failure to prove the existence of insurrec-
tion was fatal to its civil war defense. Citing Pan American, the
court agreed that civil war was a "progressive stage" that must
first be preceeded by insurrection. Insurrection is the intent to
overthrow an existing government and seize its power, and with-
out that rudimentary intent there cannot be civil war.
161
As to the "war" claim, Aetna argued that the fighting in Leba-
non involved "three clearly-defined independent entities, each
having the attributes of sovereignty or, at the least, quasi-sover-
eignty," and therefore the war exclusion could be applied to
deny coverage. 6' In evaluating Aetna's claim of quasi-sover-
eignty, the court focused only on the one faction occupying the
Holiday Inn and doing the damage at the time of the fighting.'62
The court concluded that this faction did "not rise to the level
the status of a sovereign state," and concluded that it was not a
sovereign entity. 1 63 Alternatively, the court stated that even if
the group was recognized as a quasi-sovereign entity, it was not
at war with another sovereign governmental entity that contrib-
uted to the damage, therefore, the insurer could not invoke the
war exclusion clause. 164 If applied to the September 11 attacks,
Holiday Inn seems to suggest that insurance carriers will not be
able to rely on claims of insurrection, civil war, or war.
On the other hand, one court ruled that the war exclusion
applied to property stolen during a period of hostilities between
the United States and Panama in TRT/FTC Communications, Inc.
v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania.65 Civil disorder
erupted in the central business district of Panama City, where
156 Id. at 1488-89.
157 Id. at 1488.
158 Id. at 1493.
159 See id. at 1493-94.
160 See id. at 1494-95.
161 Id. at 1501.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 1502.
164 Id. at 1503.
165 TRT/FTC Comms., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 847 F. Supp. 28 (Del. 1993).
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TRT operated a sales facility. 166 Armed men in civilian clothing,
carrying military assault rifles, broke into the facility and stole
merchandise and equipment.167 At the time of the theft, Pan-
ama had declared war on the United States and was in a war
preparedness status, the court determined that the men who
robbed TRT were part of some arm of the Panamanian govern-
ment's forces involved in the war effort. 6 However, the court
stated, "regardless of whether the men were part of the Panama-
nian forces or a band of looters, there is ample evidence to sup-
port the conclusion that their actions against TRT were enabled
by the military hostilities occurring between Panama and the
United States.' 1 69 Although those perpetrating the theft may
not have been part of the military or government of Panama,
the loss that they caused would not have occurred absent Pan-
ama's declaration of war and the U.S. invasion of Panama.1 70
This court supported the idea that even though a non-sovereign
caused the loss in question, the act was triggered by the exis-
tence of military hostilities between Panama and the United
States. In any event, an insurer relying on this holding would
have to prove that loss claimed was a result of existing hostilities
between the United States and another sovereign government,
even if the party causing the loss were a non-sovereign.
Another conclusion that has arisen from past interpretations
of the war exclusion is that, to be excluded by that clause, a
claim must involve a hazard distinct from that of peacetime. In
other words, neither aggravation of a hazard existing in peace-
time nor removal of a peacetime safeguard constitutes a war risk
or a warlike operation. The following cases discuss this point
and emphasize that courts will relegate the war exclusion to a
nonperforming role if it can be shown that damage to covered
property can otherwise be attributed to some other specified
cause of loss.
In Queen Insurance Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., the
United States Supreme Court held that damage from collision
of two merchant ships sailing the Atlantic Ocean in separate
convoys during World War I, with no hostile warships apparently
present, was not a war risk, although the convoys were traveling
at night without lights and one convoy had changed its course
166 Id. at 29.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 30.
170 Id.
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because of a submarine attack in the North Atlantic a few hours
earlier.'7 1 Applying a very narrow causation rule, the Supreme
Court concluded that the damage was the result of a collision,
and it could have resulted at any time, during war or peace.
17 2
This case is old but still valid since courts in the United States
have not departed from the fundamental principle laid down in
the decision. 7 3 And, on its authority, most insurance profes-
sionals assumed, even during World War II, that such things as
the aircraft damage section of the extended coverage endorse-
ment would cover damage from the crash of a military or naval
aircraft during training maneuvers, and that damage from an
otherwise insured peril would not be excluded merely because it
occurred during a blackout.1 7
In Airlift International, Inc. v. United States, the federal court
was presented with a claim when an insured aircraft was lost over
Vietnam during wartime after it collided with a military air-
craft.1 75 The insurer denied coverage based on the war exclu-
sion, but the court held that the loss was due to an aviation peril,
although the two aircraft were flying over Vietnam only because
there was a war raging.1 76 The court decided that the collision
was not a hazard existing only in wartime and, therefore, the
exclusion was not applicable in this case.
177
In American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Sunny South Aircraft Service,
Inc., a Florida court heard arguments that the war exclusion
should apply against a claim for loss to an aircraft that was hi-
jacked en route to Cuba and was then damaged by a Cuban mili-
tary plane. 178 The court found that the loss was proximately
caused by theft rather than warlike activity, so the war exclusion
did not preclude coverage.1 79 Theft was not considered a haz-
ard distinct from that of peacetime, so even though the insured
plane was damaged by a warplane, the war exclusion would not
apply to this type of loss.1 8 °
171 Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487 (1924).
172 Id. at 488.
173 Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 992.
174 Id.
175 Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 460 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1972).
176 Id. at 1066.
177 Id.
178 Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunny S. Aircraft Serv., Inc., 151 So.2d 276 (Fla.
1973).




Finally, a number of cases arising early in World War II estab-
lished the conclusion that war need not be officially declared in
order for an insurer to invoke the war exclusion. Cases involving
life and accident insurance (but with war exclusions worded sim-
ilarly to that found on a standard property insurance form) held
that the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was war within the mean-
ing of the exclusion clauses even though there had been no for-
mal declaration of war at the time of the attack. Typical of these
cases is New York Life Insurance Company v. Bennion.8 " In con-
trast, another life insurance case, Stinson v. New York Life Insur-
ance Company, held the war to be over, as far as an insurance
exclusion was concerned, after the cessation of actual fighting in
1945, even though there had been no official and formal decla-
ration of peace.1
82
War exclusions on property forms today specifically refer to
undeclared war, 183 so any hostilities carried out by a sovereign
state against another sovereign state will be considered subject
to the war exclusion regardless of whether or not war has been
officially declared. Courts have enforced war, civil war, and in-
surrection exclusions, but in each case, the property in question
was damaged during a war or armed invasion, or by defined
groups acting with the express purpose of ousting the existing
government. 184
Carriers that assert war-risk exclusions will be forced to prove
such exclusions apply to sustain any claim denials. Current evi-
dence does not appear to support application of those exclu-
181 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
182 Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
183 See MARcO, supra text accompanying note 77.
184 See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954) (Puerto Rican
nationalists attempting to oust the United States from its "occupation" of Puerto
Rico); Wilker Bros. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 529 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) and Ope Shipping Ltd. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 521 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (ships seized during the Sandinista National Liberation Front ouster of
Nicaraguan dictator Somoza); Int'l Dairy Eng'g Co. of Asia Inc. v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973) (damage to warehoused goods
from a parachute flare dropped during the Vietnam war); Younis Bros. & Co. Inc.
v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 13 (3d Cir. 1996) (damage to supermarkets
during the Liberian civil war); TRT/FTC Comm. Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 847 F.
Supp. 28 (D. Del. 1993) (telecommunications equipment stolen during the U.S.
invasion of Panama); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 105 F.3d 258 (6th
Cir. 1997) (damage during the U.S. invasion of Panama).
British courts have enforced the exclusions in connection with damage caused by
the Spanish civil war and 1916 Easter Rebellion. See Pesquerias y Secaderos de
Bacalao de Espana S.A. v. Beer, 1 All E.R. 845 (H.L. 1949); Curtis & Sons v.
Mathews, 2 K.B. 825 (1919).
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sions to September 11. The Pan American opinion also makes
clear that something more than evidence of financial assistance
will be required to show that those involved were acting on be-
half of a sovereign power in furtherance of war or warlike activi-
ties. Courts resolving any such disputes will undoubtedly note
that terrorists tried to bring down the World Trade Center tow-
ers in 1993 and that carriers had ample opportunity to modify
their exclusions to explicitly include acts of terrorism.
C. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958' authorized the Secretary
of Transportation to provide war risk insurance and reinsur-
ance 86 by the United States whenever such insurance was neces-
sary to meet the needs of air commerce of the United States and
such insurance could not be reasonably acquired from the pri-
vate market.18 7  American or foreign-flag carriers could
purchase insurance or reinsurance to protect against any risk of
loss or damage from aircraft operations.1 8 The Federal Avia-
tion Act ("the Act") authorized the secretary to insure or rein-
sure for the reasonable value of the aircraft in keeping with the
reasonable aviation market, and only when other insurance
could not be obtained under reasonable terms.18 9 A critical lim-
itation of the Act was that coverage applied only to aircraft loss
or damage occurring either "(A) in foreign air commerce; or
(B) between at least 2 places, all of which are outside the United
States."' 90 The Act, therefore, did not cover domestic flights
originating and ending in the United States. Presumably, cover-
age under the Act would not apply to any of the flights lost on
September 11, as they all originated in and were destined to
land in the continental United States.
On September 22, 2001, in response to the September 11 at-
tacks, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act as part of an
185 49 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 44301-
44310 (Law. Co-op. 2000 & Supp. 2002)).
186 "Reinsurance" is an agreement between an insurance provider or primary
insurer, and a second insurance company called the reinsurer. The reinsurer
agrees to accept a portion of the primary insurer's risk under one or more poli-
cies. Reinsurance spreads losses and protects primary insurers from a cata-
strophic loss or the aggregation of several losses resulting from one single
occurrence. See WELLS & CHADBOURNE, supra note 36, at 54.
187 Pan Am., 505 F.2d at 994; MARGO, supra note 69, at 235.
188 49 U.S.C.A. § 44302(a)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2001).
189 Id. § 44 302(a) (2).
190 Id. § 44302(a) (1).
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aviation relief package. The Air Transportation Safety and Sys-
tem Stabilization Act of 2001 (ATA)' 9' was created to "preserve
the continued viability of the United States air transportation
system.' 92 The ATA addressed airline stabilization, aviation in-
surance, tax provisions, victim compensation, and air transporta-
tion safety.1 93 Title 2 of the ATA expressly amended section
44302 of the Federal Aviation Act.194 The ATA removed the
clause that previously limited coverage only to aircraft involved
in foreign commerce or operating outside the United States.
195
Under the revised statute, any American aircraft or foreign-flag
aircraft may now purchase United States government insurance
or re-insurance, although now the Secretary of Transportation
must first acquire approval from the President of the United
States.1 96 Subsection b of the Federal Aviation Act now allows
the secretary, for a limited period of time, to reimburse air carri-
ers for the increase in cost of insurance implicitly arising from
the September 11 attacks.' 97 Under this provision, the Secretary
of Transportation is authorized to reimburse air carriers for the
amount by which their insurance premiums increase during
their upcoming policy period or through October 1, 2001,
191 Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 201-601, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
192 Id. § 230.
1'3 See id. §§ 230-41.
194 Id. §§ 234-36.
195 49 U.S.C.S. § 44302(a) (Law. Co-op. January 2002).
196 Id. § 44302(c).
197 It states:
(1) In general. The Secretary may reimburse an air carrier for the
increase in the cost of insurance, with respect to a premium for
coverage ending before October 1, 2002, against loss or damage
arising out of any risk from the operation of an American aircraft
over the insurance premium that was in effect for a comparable
operation during the period beginning September 4, 2001, and
ending September 10, 2001, as the Secretary may determine. Such
reimbursement is subject to subsections (a) (2), (c), and (d) of this
section and to section 44303. (2) Payment from revolving fund. A
reimbursement under this subsection shall be paid from the revolv-
ing fund established by section 44307. (3) Further conditions. The
Secretary may impose such further conditions on insurance for
which the increase in premium is subject to reimbursement under
this subsection as the Secretary may deem appropriate in the inter-
est of air commerce. (4) Termination of authority. The authority
to reimburse air carriers under this subsection shall expire 180 days
after the date of enactment of this paragraph [enacted Sept. 22,
2001].
Id. § 44302(b).
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whichever date came earlier.19 The reimbursement would be
based on the cost of air carriers' coverage in effect between Sep-
tember 4 and September 10, 2001.199 The Secretary would have
authority to grant the reimbursements for 180 days after enact-
ment of the legislation. 20 This period of time, six months, pro-
vides air carriers with just enough time to renegotiate contracts
with their insurance providers.
This legislation contains an important liability cap specifically
for American Airlines, United Airlines, the airports where the
terrorists boarded the jets they hijacked on September 11 and
the manufacturers of those planes and their component parts.
Under the legislation, only federal courts will have jurisdiction
in litigation over the liability of those entities.20 Any liability im-
posed on those parties could not exceed their liability insurance
coverage. 20 2 Furthermore, any such awards would have to be re-
duced by court-approved settlements the parties had reached
for losses that resulted from the attack.20 1 Courts also would be
barred from ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs' punitive
damages or pre-judgment interest.20 4
D. THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM EXCLUSIONS
Most insurers and reinsurers did not insert terrorism exclu-
sions in their policies before September 11.205 Subsequent to
the attacks, many reinsurers announced that in the future they
would refuse to provide reinsurance coverage for acts of terror-
ism. 2 6 Without such coverage from reinsurers, insurers will find
it very difficult to reserve enough capital designated to cover any
future catastrophes caused by terrorist acts. 20 7 Without any gov-
ernment intervention, insurers would have no recourse but to
approve a terrorist exclusion within their policies or risk poten-








205 See Auto Insurance Report, supra note 20.
206 Letter from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to "All
Property & Casualty Insurers Writing Commercial Lines Insurance Products"
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the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
adopted temporary terrorism exclusions. 20 9 The NAIC granted
approval to terrorism exclusions drawn equal to or similar to
those drafted by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). 21° These
exclusions drafted by the ISO are very broad and seem to apply
a very liberal definition of the term "terrorism. ''2 11 For property
insurance policies, terrorist exclusions would only apply if the
terrorist act resulted in industry-wide losses in excess of
$25,000,000 for related incidents occurring within 72 hours of
each other.212 For liability insurance policies, terrorist exclu-
sions apply only if the terrorist act causes $25,000,000 in indus-
try-wide insured losses for related incidents occuring within 72
209 The NAIC adopted a motion stating,
[I] f the Congress adjourns without enacting federal terrorism legis-
lation, the states should grant conditional approval to commercial
lines endorsements that exclude coverage for acts of terrorism con-
sistent with the exclusion framework developed by ISO. To the ex-
tent permitted by state law, such approvals would sunset or be
withdrawn 15 business days after the President signs into law a fed-
eral backstop to address insurance losses attributed to acts of terror-
ism, or be subject to other conditions on the approval consistent
with state law.
Id. at 1.
210 The ISO approved the use of its copyrighted provisions to any insurer, in-
cluding those not licensed by the ISO. Id. at 2.
211 Terrorism means activities against persons, organizations or property of any
nature:
1. That involve the following or preparation for the following:
a. Use or threat of force or violence; or
b. Commission or threat of a dangerous act; or
c. Commission or threat of an act that interferes with or disrupts
an electronic, communication, information, or mechanical
system; and
2. When one or both of the following applies:
a. The effect is to intimidate or coerce a government or the ci-
vilian population of any segment thereof, or to disrupt any
segment of the economy; or
b. It appears that the intent is to intimidate or coerce a govern-
ment or to further political, ideological, religious, social or
economic objectives or to express (or to express opposition
to) a philosophy or ideology.
Id. at 3.
212 Exclusions for acts of terrorism are not subject to the limitations mentioned
if: "the act involves the use, release or escape of nuclear materials, or that directly
or indirectly results in nuclear reaction or radiation or radioactive contamina-
tion; The act is carried out by means of the dispersal or application of pathogenic
or poisonous biological or chemical materials; or Pathogenic or poisonous bio-
logical or chemical materials are released, and it appears that one purpose of the
terrorism was to release such materials." Id. at 2.
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hours of each other, or if fifty or more persons are killed or
sustain "serious physical injury."2 13
V. CONCLUSION
The September 11 attacks were not an act of war within the
context of insurance and legal application. There was no war
being fought at the time of the attacks. The United States was
not involved in hostilities with a sovereign or quasi-sovereign
government when it suffered the terrorist attacks. Insurers will
not be able to deny coverage by claiming a war exclusion de-
fense, assuming they are bold and willing enough to suffer
through the public relations nightmare of filing such a claim.
The September 11 attacks were not an act of insurrection, re-
bellion, revolution, or invasion. The terrorist attacks did not
seem to intend to overthrow the government or seize the gov-
ernment's power. This would be the case even if one of the air-
planes had succeeded in destroying one or more of America's
branches of power. There must have been a violent uprising
specifically intended to overthrow the existing powers and to
subsequently assume that power. Civil war would necessarily re-
quire the occurrence of one of these events. Insurers cannot
rely on such terms to avoid September 11 liability.
Many changes will result from September 11. Existing caselaw
dealing with war exclusions might not be the norm for future
events. Terrorism and war have become one. The lines have
been blurred. Terrorism exclusions will become as prevalent as
war exclusions in insurance policies. This will result in massive
cost increases for the private market unless the United States
and other world governments step in and become the ultimate
carriers of excess liability and property insurance protection.
213 For purposes of the policies, serious physical injury is defined as: "Physical
injury that involves a substantial risk of death; Protracted and obvious physical
disfigurement; or Protracted loss of or impairment of the function of a bodily
member or organ." Id. Furthermore, the exclusions are not subject to the stated
limitations if: "the act involves the use, release or escape of nuclear materials, or
that directly or indirectly results in nuclear reaction or radiation or radioactive
contamination; The act is carried out by means of the dispersal or application of
pathogenic or poisonous biological or chemical materials; or Pathogenic or poi-
sonous biological or chemical materials are released, and it appears that one pur-
pose of the terrorism was to release such materials." Id.
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